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At his own time, Hume was known primarily as a historian and essayist. He was not known 
as a natural philosopher or, to use our terminology, a natural scientist.1 Hume is usually not 
placed in the canonical listings of the history of early modern science, which include figures 
like Isaac Newton (1646-1727), Robert Boyle (1627-1691), Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695), 
and Carl von Linné (1707-1778). 
 
Hume's contributions to "philosophy and general learning" revolve around his science of man 
and the study of the human mind. Even though he probably wanted to emulate the 
explanatory success of Newton's natural philosophy in his moral philosophy, the main 
concern of his philosophical work is in mapping the cognitive structures of the mind (Ott 
2009: 191; Harris 2015: 85). Hume's objective is not to explain the "natural and physical 
causes" of our perceptions, as this task is for "the sciences of anatomy and natural 
philosophy" (T 2.1.1.2; SBN 275-6).  Hume’s ambition is to develop a human science which 
is different from natural science. 
 
Although the main focus of Hume's career was in the humanities, his work also has an 
observable role in the historical development of natural sciences after his time. To show this, 
I shall center on the relation between Hume and two major figures in the history of the 
natural sciences: Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and Albert Einstein (1879-1955). Both of these 
scientists read Hume. They also found parts of Hume’s work useful to their sciences. 
Inquiring into the relations between Hume and the two scientists shows that his philosophical 
positions had a partial, but constructive role in the formation of modern biology and physics. 
This is accordingly a clear indication of Hume's impact on the scientific tradition. 
 
Before proceeding to analyze Hume’s contribution to the history of science, it is important to 
address his broader role in the history of philosophy of science. Hume’s discussions 
concerning the topics of causation, induction, the distinction between mathematical and 
empirical propositions, and laws of nature have been important for the philosophy of science 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
 
Hume in the History of Philosophy of Science 
 
Among scholars who contributed to the philosophy of science in the eighteenth century, the 
background of Hume (as well as the British empiricist tradition more broadly conceived) can 
be seen in the influential work System of Logic by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Mill was 
sympathetic to Hume’s account of causation and induction. Inhe alsosomewhat developed it. 
He thought, as Hume had argued, that there are no objective necessary connections among 
species of objects or events. Inductive inference does not guarantee apodictic certainty. 
However, this is not to deny inductive inference. It is possible to address different levels of 
probability to propositions concerning matters of fact (Wilson 2016: section 3, Induction). 
 
In the twentieth century philosophy of science, Hume’s impact can be seen most clearly in 
the doctrines of logical positivism. In Alexander Rosenberg’s (1993: 64) estimation, the 
positivists and members of the Vienna Circle even preferred to call their program logical 
empiricism, to show their debt to Humean empiricism rather than to Auguste Comte’s (1798-
1857) positivism. 
 A particularly good example of Hume’s influence on logical positivism can be found in A.J. 
Ayer's (1910-1989) 1936 book Language, Truth and Logic. In retrospect, as a popularization 
of “what may be called the classical position of the Vienna Circle,” Ayer characterized 
“Language, Truth and Logic as being no more than Hume in modern dress” (Ayer 1959: 8; 
1987: 24). Right from the beginning of his work, Ayer endorses, in no uncertain terms, 
Hume's distinction between the propositions concerning relations of ideas and matters of fact. 
Thus he commences his work: “Like Hume, I divide all genuine propositions into two 
classes: those which, in his terminology, concern 'relations of ideas', and those which concern 
'matters of fact.'” Within the former Ayer includes analytic “a priori propositions of logic and 
pure mathematics,” and to the latter synthetic “propositions concerning empirical matters of 
fact.” Ayer understood analytic propositions to be true in virtue of their meaning, and 
synthetic propositions to be “determined by the facts of experience.” He took himself to be 
following Hume's footsteps, holding analytic statements to be necessary and certain, whereas 
empirical facts are “hypotheses, which can be probable but not certain” (Ayer 2001: 9, 72-3). 
 
To produce textual evidence for his starting point, Ayer quotes the famous concluding 
paragraph of Hume's first Enquiry. In Ayer's (1959: 10) opinion, this paragraph is “an 
excellent statement of the positivist's position”: 
 
“When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must 
we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, 
for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning 
quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For 
it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (EHU 12.34; SBN 165). 
 
In Ayer's view, Hume was the first hero of logical positivism. He thought that Hume 
championed the divide between the analytic and the synthetic. As the truths of mathematics 
and logic were to Ayer analytic and a priori necessary, he saw the movement of logical 
positivism to have vindicated “the empiricist claim that there can be no a priori knowledge of 
reality” (Ayer 2001: 83). If Ayer's Hume-interpretation were correct, he had a good reason in 
stating that “it is indeed remarkable how much of the doctrine that is now thought to be 
especially characteristic of logical positivism was already stated, or at least foreshadowed, by 
Hume” (Ayer 1959: 4).2 
 
Although logical positivism was the most influential tradition in the philosophy of science 
between the two world wars, the movement eventually came to an end. In 1967, John 
Passmore (1967: 57) famously voiced that logical positivism “is dead, or as dead as a 
philosophical movement ever becomes.” In its philosophy, there were a number of 
irresolvable problems. The principle of verifiability, according to which a cognitive statement 
is meaningful only if it is empirically testable, was self-refuting: the principle could not itself 
stand the test. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) later philosophy indicated the problems of 
radical concept empiricism. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argued that the 
meaning of the word is its use in a language game. The Humean-positivist theory had 
maintained that words get their meaning by a reference to sensuous impressions; this was 
now seen as a commitment to an untenable doctrine of private language. W.V. Quine (1908-
2000) set forth a detailed critique of the analytic synthetic divide in his groundbreaking 
article “The Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). He argued that the truths of pure 
mathematics and logic are not in principle distinguishable from the propositions of empirical 
science. In Quine’s holism, the totality of our knowledge and beliefs form a sphere “which 
impinges on experience only along the edges” (Quine 1951: 39). Although logical and 
mathematical truths are in the center of the sphere, and most unlikely to be revised, they are 
still not immune from the findings of the empirical sciences. In the 1970’s, a rehabilitation of 
metaphysics was seen in the philosophies of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) and 
David Lewis. Their works recreated traditional metaphysical questions of essences, natural 
kinds and rigid designation (Ladyman & Ross 2007: 9). 
 
Karl Popper’s (1902-1994) philosophy of science was essentially a reaction to the positivist 
verification principle. He viewed Hume’s account of induction both positively and 
negatively. He thought that Hume had shown that there cannot be legitimate truth-preserving 
inductive inference. However, Popper (1972, section 1) also argued that science does not and 
should not employ induction. In his view, the proper logic of science is falsificationism based 
on the modus tollens rule of inference. Popper has been, however, criticized for “smuggling” 
induction in his notion of corroboration of theories. William Edward Morris (2011: 460) 
argues that 
 
“corroboration isn’t really much different from confirmation, and seems to have 
an inductive inference embedded in it – the inference from the fact that a 
conjecture has thus far escaped falsification to the (admittedly fallible) 
conclusion that it will continue to do so. 
Since corroboration provides a way to accept conjectures […], it is 
ampliative, and therefore should count as a non-demonstrative form of 
inference. To the extent that Popper’s theory is inductive, it fails to evade 
Hume’s argument.” 
 
The fact that Popper was not able to refute Hume on induction, does not mean that 
philosophers of science after him would subscribe to induction as the logic of science. 
Contemporary philosophers of science, for example, Peter Godfrey-Smith (2003: Chapter 3), 
have argued for pluralism of scientific inferences; there is no one valid mode of inference but 
several modes, including induction, deduction and abduction. 
 
Hume’s regularity theory of causation (which is the traditional interpretation of his position),3 
has been reviewed critically by contemporary metaphysicians and philosophers of science. 
The basic problem of the regularity theory is that it does not properly distinguish between 
correlation and causation. To paraphrase Nancy Cartwright (1979), regularity is not sufficient 
for making a difference between effective and ineffective strategies. Buying a certain health 
insurance is statistically correlated with a longer lifetime, but the purchase of the insurance is 
not an effective strategy for prolonging one’s life (as compared to physical exercise and 
proper diet). In addition to regularity, or probability of effects appearing after their causes, it 
has been suggested that causation needs also to be defined in counterfactual and 
interventionist terms. The counterfactual condition requires that if a cause did not happen, its 
effect would not ensue either (Menzies 2014). The interventionist position emphasizes the 
role of manipulability in causal relations: if the cause is intervened on, there will be a change 
in the effect (Woodward 2003). 
 
In contemporary philosophy of physics, Hume’s account of the metaphysics of laws of nature 
remains highly influential. It is commonplace to introduce two rival positions on the modal 
status of laws: the Humean and the non-Humean. According to the former position, laws are 
accurate records of universal generalizations. The non-Humean positions maintains that there 
is a specific modal character in laws of nature, namely physical necessity. Non-Humeanism 
about laws maintains that the Humean view is not able to make a credible distinction between 
laws and accidentally true generalizations. To explain the non-Humean view, consider the 
following claims. There are no golden or uranium spheres larger than one mile in diameter. 
Although both of these claims are true, the first is true by accident: it would be physically 
possible to construct such a golden sphere. But it would not be physically possible to 
construct such an uranium sphere; this is restricted by the laws of nuclear physics (Carroll 
2016). The non-Humeans maintain that, for example, massy particles cannot travel at the 
speed of light, whereas the Humeans hold the more cautious view that so far we have not 
been able to produce such accelerations. 
 
Hume’s science of human nature is also relevant for contemporary neuroscience and 
philosophy of mind. This is evident in Antonio Damasio’s work Descartes’ Error (1995). In 
his work, Damasio (1995: 108) explicitly draws on Hume’s notion of mental images, which 
can be both “faint” and “lively.” There are many important parallels in their positions: the 
centrality of representational images in our thought, the quintessential role that emotions play 
in cognition, and the denial of substantial self in which our mental states supposedly inhere. 
As Morris (2011: 471) puts it, Damasio brings “many of Hume’s fundamental views into an 
exciting, plausible, and ─ ultimately ─ testable account of human cognition.” 
 
In the next section, I shall draw my attention to Hume’s role in the history of science by 
concentrating on his relation to two major figures of the scientific tradition: Darwin and 
Einstein. I shall argue that Darwin's reading of Hume strengthened his naturalistic world view 
which maintains that the difference between human and animal reason and cognition is a 
matter of degree, not kind. This contributed to Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural 
selection. Both Hume and Darwin thought that reason is not a special human faculty, but that 
it evolves gradually from animal instincts. In the subsequent section, I shall argue that 
Einstein inherited from Hume (and Mach) an empiricist theory of concepts, which he then 
went on to realize in his argument for the relativity of simultaneity. This fundamental result 
of the special theory of relativity debunked the Newtonian assumption that time is absolute. 
Hume, and the empiricist tradition more broadly, paved the way for a critical understanding 
of the ontology of time (and space) as not being absolute, self-sustaining structures. 
 
Hume and Darwin: Reason, Cognition, and the Human-Animal Distinction 
 
To paint with a very broad brush, the dominant view in the history of Western philosophy 
regarding the relationship between humans and animals is anthropocentric. In ancient, 
medieval and early modern philosophy, many prominent philosophers assumed that there is a 
categorical difference between human and animal reason. 
 
Since Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC), and especially since neo-Platonism in 
late Antiquity, a very popular view concerning the relationship between the beings of the 
world was expressed in the idea of the ladder of nature (scala naturae) (Bunnin & Yu 2004: 
289; Lovejoy 1936: 58–59). According to this view—sometimes also referred to as the 
“Great Chain of Being” —there is a hierarchical structure in the world. This hierarchy 
includes the divine, living and non-living parts of the universe. In the highest category there 
is God. In the next category come divine creatures like angels. After this there are humans, 
next animals, and then plants. Inanimate matter is placed at the lowest level. 
 In the scholastic period in Europe (roughly 1100-1500), theological considerations together 
with philosophical discussions based on the Aristotelian tradition emphasized the difference 
between human and animal reason. Thomas Aquinas shared the view of the ladder of nature. 
In his view, only humans and supreme beings like angels and God are intellectual. Human 
intellect is the lowest form of the intellect (Clark 2000: 66). Aquinas’ conception is a direct 
continuation of the Aristotelian conception, which states that only humans have the rational 
part of the soul. 
 
In the early modern period, Descartes’ philosophy provides the clearest example of the view 
that there is a categorical difference between human and animal reason. In Descartes, only 
humans and angels are beings with minds. He thought that non-human animals are automata, 
sophisticated mechanical organs created by God. Descartes argues in his Discourse of the 
Method that reason is “the only thing that makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts 
[lower non-human animals].” He did not think that “beasts have less reason than men,” but 
that “they do not have reason at all” (Descartes 2000: 68, 148). 
 
Hume's position regarding the distinction between human and animal reason is very different 
compared to the traditional view in the history of Western philosophy. This is evident both in 
his Treatise and his first Enquiry. On Hume’s account, animal and human cognition works in 
fundamentally the same manner. This account concentrates on the notions of experience, 
causation, and uniformity of nature. 
 
For Hume, we receive information of causal relations by experience (T 1.3.1.1; SBN 69).  As 
reasoning concerning matters of fact is founded on experience, it is also the source of factual 
knowledge (EHU 4.14; SBN 32). The nature of experience is the following. We remember 
having observed two species of objects or events as being constantly conjoined in the past (T 
1.3.6.2; SBN 87). For instance, I remember that when I placed my finger near to a candle 
flame, I felt heat. Experience enables me to infer the fact that flame causes heat. Hume 
contrasts experience to reason, since the latter does not “make us pass from one object to 
another.” This requires the faculty of imagination: 
 
“Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with another, tho’ aided 
by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past 
instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one 
object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by 
certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite 
them in the imagination” (T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92; see also Garrett 1997: 76). 
 
Both humans and non-human animals experience. They are both equipped with sensory 
systems and the faculty of memory. Humans and non-human animals are thus able to 
perceive objects and events, and infer some constant conjunctions and regularities between 
them. Both base their causal reasoning—the way in which they identify causality—on the 
uniformity of nature. "It seems evident," Hume writes "that animals, as well as men learn 
many things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always follow from the 
same causes." (EHU 9.2; SBN 105) For example, an experienced horse knows, based on its 
previous experience, which fences it can jump, so it will not attempt to jump fences that it 
cannot handle. In chase, an experienced greyhound knows to leave the most fatiguing parts of 
the chase to the young, unexperienced hounds, instead waiting for the hare in a specific 
location where it is most likely to appear. 
 When animals infer from causes to effects, they do not base their inferences on any principle 
founded on reason. With an argument from analogy, Hume claims that the same is true with 
regard to humans: 
 
Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are 
children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and 
conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of 
life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar [ordinary people], and are 
governed by the same maxims (EHU 9.5; SBN 106). 
 
Hume's position on the relation between human and animal cognition is radical. He suggests 
that reasoning is fundamentally an instinctive process. He maintains that 
 
the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and 
on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct 
[...] Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a 
man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such 
exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery 
(EHU 9.6; SBN 108). 
 
Hume shrinks the gap between the human and animal reason into a difference of degree. 
Unlike many of his predecessors, for which Descartes is an excellent example, he did not 
understand reason as being a quasi-divine feature, a faculty by which humans can 
understands the God-created world. Peter Millican (2007: xlviii-xlix) expounds on the 
controversiality of Hume’s position as compared to many of his predecessors: 
 
Human reason was commonly [in the eighteenth century] thought to be quasi-
divine or angelic rather than beastlike, a faculty expressing the essence of our 
unique immaterial soul, capable of providing transparent insight into the nature 
of things and operating quite independently of brute animal instincts. 
 
In the Treatise Hume strongly criticizes the Cartesian conception by contending that "no truth 
appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason as well as 
men" (T 1.3.16.1; SBN 176).  He thinks that arguments for this case are "so obvious, that 
they never escape the most stupid and ignorant" (T 1.3.16.1; SBN 176).  In Hume's stance, 
human reason is not opposite to animal instinct, but emerges from it. Like animals, we 
humans acquire knowledge of nature by sensory input and frequent experience. 
 
Hume on the relation between human and animal reason and cognition made a deep impact 
on Darwin. In August 1838, some twenty years before the publication of his Origins of 
Species, and exactly at the time when Darwin was formulating his theory of natural selection, 
he was reading the first Enquiry. He wrote in his notebook (N101) that "Hume has section 
(IX) on Reason of Animals ... he seems to allow it is an instinct." As Hume had claimed, 
reasoning is a form of natural instinct. By this he means that when humans or non-human 
animals infer “that like events must follow like objects,” they both rely on the assumption 
“that the course of nature will always be regular in its operations” (EHU 9.5; SBN 106). This 
assumption of the uniformity of nature is not founded on reasoning in any way. Rather, it is 
founded on non-voluntary, customary, habitual and instinctive aspects of our natures. 
 Darwin wrote in his notebook (after reading Hume) that intellectual activity is a 
"modification of instinct – an unfolding & generalizing of the means by which an instinct is 
transmitted" (Darwin's Notebook N48). As Robert J. Richards (2003: 95) expounds, to 
Darwin this meant that "human intelligence was, then, not opposed to animal instinct but 
grew out of it in the course of ages." Darwin's conception draws consciously on Hume as he 
pointed out that in Hume's account the "origin of reason" is "gradually developed" (Darwin's 
Notebook N101) 
 
Moreover, Hume's copy principle is also consistent with the position that animal and human 
mentality are in continuation. As our ideas and thoughts are copied from simple sensory 
impressions, there is no reason why animals, who possess similar sensory systems than 
humans, would not be capable of thought. Darwin explored this idea further, and went on to 
devise a sensationalist epistemology which he wrote down in one of his notebooks. Although 
Darwin does not explicitly mention Hume in this context, he argued, in a way that would 
have been very congenial to Hume, that the basis of complex thought is in the comparison of 
simple sensory images (Darwin's Notebook N21E; Richards 2003: 95). 
 
Darwin's own scientific arguments for the difference of degree between human and animal 
cognition are made explicit in his main work Of the Origin of Species by Means of Natural 
Selection from the year 1859. Natural selection results from three combined principles: 1) 
tendency of offspring to resemble parents, 2) variation, and 3) superfecundity, that is, 
Malthusian production of more offspring than can possible survive. Thus Darwin puts it as 
follows: 
 
As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; 
and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it 
follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to 
itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a 
better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong 
principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and 
modified form (Darwin 2006: 3). 
 
Because of variation, it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line between individual 
differences and slight varieties, between slight varieties and more distinct varieties, between 
more distinct varieties and sub-species, between sub-species and species, and finally, between 
species (Darwin 2006: 294). Darwin (2006: 34) stresses that he looks 
 
at the term species as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set 
of individuals closely resembling each other, and that it does not essentially 
differ from the term variety, which is given to less distinct and more fluctuating 
forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with mere individual differences, 
is also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience sake. 
 
The conclusion Darwin draws in the Origin is that all forms of life are part of one and the 
same tree of life. All species have probably evolved from a simple form or few forms of life 
(2006: 307). 
 
 Figure 1 Darwin's tree of life (Diagram of Divergence of Taxa) as depicted in the Origin. Source of the Figure: 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Origin_of_Species_(1859)/Chapter_IV. 
 
In his Descent of Man, Darwin does, however, argue that humans have abilities that have 
developed further than in other animals. Such abilities include the development and 
application of an articulate language, manufacturing of weapons, tools and traps, abstract 
thought, and self-consciousness. These capabilities have made human dominance in nature 
possible. Darwin also thinks that as self-reflecting beings humans are capable of making 
moral inferences. We can critically review our past actions, and conclude that we could have 
acted differently (Darwin 2007: 83-4, 404). In this respect, he maintains that there are 
important differences between humans and other animals. Interestingly, Hume also thinks 
that non-human animals are not capable of making moral judgments, neither concerning their 
own actions nor what others should do (Boyle 2003: 21). 
 
But these differences are nothing like what has been traditionally assumed in the history of 
Western philosophy. There is no ladder of life—"nature does not make jumps," as Darwin 
and many natural philosophers had claimed before him—but a tree of life. And humans are 
just one branch of this tree. 
 
Hume did not say anything about the common tree of life, or about the way in which the 
branches of the family tree divide over and over again. It is not clear if Hume even had any 
position about the nature of species. Accordingly, Hume seems not to have theorized on 
sexual selection, which is one of the cornerstones of Darwin's work. In the Dialogues, there 
are some scattered remarks which suggest that Hume had some idea of evolution by means of 
natural selection. In the line of Philo, Hume writes the following: "You ascribe, Cleanthes, 
(and I believe justly) a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object 
of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The 
preservation alone of individuals and propagation of the species" (DNR 10.26; KS 198, my 
emphasis). Here Hume says that the purpose of living beings is to survive and produce 
offspring. This would be consistent with Darwinian evolution by means of natural selection. 4 
Hume also did think, along the same lines with Darwin, that human mental faculties have 
gradually developed. They are not categorically different from those of the animals. In this 
respect, Hume's philosophy of animals instantiates a distinctly modern conception. It 
indicates that it is hopeless to draw a dichotomous and all-encompassing difference between 
humans and animals. In conclusion: The naturalistic worldview that is apparent in Hume's 
philosophy was clearly part of the intellectual background of Darwin's scientific work. 
 
 
 
Hume and Einstein: empiricism and relativity of simultaneity 
 
The commonsensical picture of time is that it flows like a river. We feel that time passes from 
past to future, no matter what. This picture is also apparent in Newton's major work 
Principia: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, a work that laid the 
foundation for classical dynamic physics.5 Thus Newton writes: 
 
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, in and of itself and of its own nature, without 
reference to anything external, flows uniformly, and by another name it is called 
duration (Newton 1999: 408). 
 
Newton's conception of time as flowing evenly and his understanding that duration is 
absolute, has two consequences: all observers agree on the absolute simultaneity of events, 
since the duration between these events is zero, and the durations between all non-
simultaneous events are absolute (Earman 1989: 8). The absoluteness of time signifies that it 
exists entirely independent of observers, physical objects, or any kind of natural events, such 
as motion of objects. We can accelerate objects but  we cannot have any influence on the 
flow of time. In Newton’s account, observers’ relations to objects are insignificant for the 
structure and passage of time. Time is universal and independent of any specific location: 
 
The moment of duration is the same at Rome and at London, on the Earth and on the 
stars, and throughout all the heavens […] each and every indivisible moment of 
duration is everywhere (Newton 2004: 26; Newton 1999: 941). 
 From its inception, Newton's argument for absolute time (and space) has been taken with a 
grain of salt. To name some figures, important 17th and 18th century philosophers and 
natural philosophers such as Huygens, G. W. F. Leibniz (1646-1716), and George Berkeley 
(1685-1753), did not subscribe to Newton's absolutism. There are many reasons for their 
critical receptions, as well as there are many intricate issues in the philosophy and physics of 
time. In what follows, I shall zero in on Hume's influence on Einstein. I shall focus on the 
empiricist epistemology of concepts, and its relation to Einstein's argument for the relativity 
of simultaneity, which effectively gave Einstein the means to reject Newton's absolute 
conception of time. 
 
In 1905, Einstein published his article "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies" ("Zur 
Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper") in the physics journal Annalen der Physik. This is the 
original publication of the special theory of relativity, although Einstein was not the only 
scientist who took part in its creation.6 The theory originated from a critical reflection of the 
19th century electrodynamic physics (see Norton 2014), but it is most well known for putting 
forth a novel theory of space, and, perhaps more importantly, time. The processes that gave 
birth to the theory have also philosophical dimensions. 
 
Einstein himself acknowledged the importance of his reading of Hume and Ernst Mach 
(1838-1916) several times. On December 1915, some ten years after the original publication 
of special relativity, and around at the time of a series of publications where he devised the 
general theory of relativity, Einstein was engaged in a correspondence with Schlick. In this 
correspondence, they discussed the philosophical issues related to special relativity. In one of 
his letters, Einstein (1998: 220) wrote that Schlick had been correct in recognizing that it was 
 Mach, and, even more, Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature I studied with 
passion and admiration shortly before discovering the [special] theory of 
relativity. Very possibly, I wouldn’t have come to the solution without those 
philosophical studies. 
 
Einstein had been reading the German translation of the Treatise in a reading group that he 
formed with his friends, philosophy student Maurice Solovine (1875-1958), and 
mathematician Conrad Habicht (1876-1958) around 1902‒1903 in Bern (Howard 2005: 36; 
Janssen, Lehner 2014: 2). In his letter to Schlick, he noted that Hume's role was more 
important in the formulation of STR than Mach's. Later in 1948, he reiterated his opinion in 
his correspondence with his friend, engineer Michele Besso (1873-1955): 
 
How far (Mach’s writings) influenced my own work is, to be honest, not clear 
to me. In so far as I can be aware, the immediate influence of D. Hume on me 
was great. I read him with Konrad Habicht and Solovine in Bern" (Speziali 
1972: 153). 
 
In the letters above, Einstein's debts to Hume are vague and unspecific. But there is one piece 
of textual evidence in his 1949 autobiographical notes where he is more specific. He points 
out that while forming the theory of special relativity, it was necessary to reject the false 
"axiom of absolute character of time, viz., simultaneity." This axiom, he writes, 
 
unrecognizedly was anchored in the unconscious. Clearly to recognize this 
axiom and its arbitrary character really implies already the solution of the 
problem. The type of critical reasoning required for the discovery of this central 
point [the denial of absolute time, that is, the denial of absolute simultaneity] 
was decisively furthered, in my case, especially by the reading of David 
Hume’s and Ernst Mach’s philosophical writings (Einstein 1949: 53). 
 
In general, historians and philosophers of physics have taken Hume's influence (or the 
influence coming from the empiricist and the positivist tradition more broadly) on Einstein to 
have focused on this central point (Norton 2010: 360, footnote 2). Understanding the 
relativity of simultaneity was a key to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory postulates of 
the theory: the light principle, and the invariance principle. According to the first principle, 
the velocity of light in a vacuum, c, is constant. It is independent of the motion of the 
emitting source of the light. According to the latter, laws of physics are invariant in all 
inertial frames of reference. They apply in the same way for all uniformly moving or 
stationary observers (measuring devices). 
 
As noted before, our commonsensical Newtonian picture of time tells us that time flows like 
a river. From the viewpoint of empiricist philosophy, the problem is that time in itself—if 
there were such a thing—is not something one can perceive. We do not acquire information 
of the putative flow of absolute time by our senses; time itself cannot be seen, touched, heard, 
tasted or smelt. 
 
If one is an empiricist about the idea or the concept of time, then its idea or concept has to be 
somehow related to a perception, observation, or experience. As John D. Norton (2010) 
shows, it was an empiricist account of concepts that Einstein learned from his reading of 
Hume (as well as Mach and possibly the empiricist and the positivist tradition of philosophy 
in general). Einstein's insight was to implement this empiricism into his argument for the 
relativity of simultaneity. In his popular book Relativity. The Special and General Theory 
from the year 1916, Einstein presents his argument with the following thought experiment. 
 
Imagine two inertial frames of reference. These are two rigid bodies, a train and a railway 
embankment. 
 
Figure 2: The relativity of simultaneity in Einstein's (2001: 27) example. Source of the Figure: 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Relativity:_The_Special_and_General_Theory/Part_I  
 
There are two observers, M and M', and two places at the embankment, A and B. The 
observer M is at rest with respect to the embankment, while the observer M' is at rest with 
respect to the train. M sees the train passing her by with a constant velocity v. While M' 
passes M, they are both located at the mid-point of the line AB. 
 
When the train passes M, two lightings strike to points A and B. The observers are both 
equipped with two mirrors that are inclined at 90 degrees. These mirrors enable them to see 
the receiving light coming from points A and B. The light travels with constant velocity c (all 
observers agree on the speed of light (in a vacuum), as established by the theory’s light 
principle). 
 
The observer M sees the lightning strikes to happen simultaneously. But how does the 
observer M' see the time ordering of the strikes? She is moving toward point B, and away 
from the point A. Therefore she is also hastening toward the light beam coming from point B, 
and away from the light beam coming from point A. In her inertial frame of reference, the 
lightning striking point B occurs before the lighting strike at point A. Consequently for her 
the strikes are non-simultaneous, that is, successive. "We thus arrive," Einstein (2001: 28-9) 
explains 
 
at the important result: Events which are simultaneous with reference to the 
embankment are not simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa 
(relativity of simultaneity). Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its 
own particular time; unless we are told the reference body to which the 
statement of time refers, there is no meaning in a statement of the time of an 
event. 
 
Crucial to Einstein's (2001: 25, 29) argumentation is the definition of the concept of 
simultaneity in empirical terms. Without the observation of lightning strikes in the 
experiment, one would not be "able to attach a meaning to the statement of simultaneity." 
The essential demand to this concept is "that in every real case it must supply us with an 
empirical decision as to whether or not the conception that has to be defined is fulfilled." 
Once simultaneity is so defined, the Newtonian absolutist assumption can be discarded, and 
the apparent tension between the two postulates of the theory of special relativity disappears. 
Einstein comments on the historical significance of the discovery of this central point: 
 Now before the advent of the theory of relativity it had always tacitly been 
assumed in physics that the statement of time had an absolute significance, i.e. 
that it is independent of the state of motion of the body of reference. 
 
With the aid of empiricist philosophy, Einstein rendered the concept of time an empirical one. 
It can be decided by experimental means that simultaneity and duration between two non-
causally related physical events is relative to inertial frames of reference. Judgments about 
time are judgments about simultaneous events in which any freely chosen periodically 
recurring system, such as a clock, is compared to a reference-object, that is, to an inertial 
frame of reference. Time-interval between two ticks of a clock is shortest in the frame of 
reference where the clock is at rest (Knight 2008: 1158); there is no meaning in speaking of 
any “absolute,” or “true” time to which any specific clock could be compared to. In special 
relativity (a theory which has now been extremely well confirmed), there is no absolute flow 
of time from earlier to later, from past to future.7 Time is not absolute nor universal the way 
Newton thought it would be. 
 
Hume and the empiricist tradition did not only shape Einstein's views on the epistemology of 
concepts. I have argued (Slavov 2016) that there are also analogies between Hume's and 
Einstein's ontological positions concerning space and time. They are both relationists. An 
important aspect of both Hume’s and Einstein’s ontologies is this: they relate the idea or the 
concept of time to objects.  
 
In Hume the abstract idea of time is acquired by perceiving change. It "can never be convey’d 
to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable,"  he writes (T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37). This 
change is perceivable either through succession or relative motion of objects. By hearing five 
successive flute chords, we can abstract the idea of time from the succession of the chords. 
Time is not something that is caused by an individual chord, a simple auditory impression. 
No single ongoing chord could cause the idea of time to the mind, because there is nothing 
changing in this object. Rather, we need to perceive a sequence of chords and pauses to get 
time's idea. Another way for us to acquire the idea of time is to perceive relative change of 
motion of bodies. Motion gives us the idea of time as "every moment is distinguish'd by a 
different position" of the moving object (T 1.2.5.29; SBN 65; Baxter 2008: 30). Hume 
encapsulates his argument concerning the origin of the idea of time: 
 
Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even 
tho’ there be a real succession in the objects. From these phaenomena, as well 
as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to 
the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is 
always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects (T 
1.2.3.7; SBN 35). 
 
Time consists of indivisible moments that are parts of succession. For us to acquire the idea 
of time, it is requisite that these parts appear to be changing: 
 
Now as time is compos’d of parts, that are not co-existent; an unchangeable 
object, since it produces none but co-existent impressions, produces none that 
can give us the idea of time; and consequently that idea must be deriv’d from a 
succession of changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be 
sever’d from such a succession (T 1.2.3.8; SBN 36). 
 
To understand Hume's reasoning,8 imagine a stationary observer in front of a huge grey wall. 
The wall is evenly painted, and it covers the observer's whole visual field. In this scenario, 
there is nothing changing in front of her. The wall is a steadfast object. It has no duration. 
Such unchangeable object cannot be the source for the idea of time, alone. 
 
Now, if something changing, like a blue object moving in front of the wall, appears, the 
observer will be able to acquire the idea of time through change of place of the object. 
Although the wall is a steadfast object, the "co-existing" moving item is not. It is changing its 
location as it is moving. Its moments, that is, different spatial locations with respect to the 
wall, are distinguishable. So there is apparent succession. However, this change or the 
appearance of succession is related to the observers' viewpoint. If the observer would be 
moving together with the object at the same relative velocity, there would not be any apparent 
change in her viewpoint.9 
 
Hume's conception of time is clearly non-absolutist. There is no one universal time but 
different times. The way we perceive time depends on observer's relations to objects. There is 
no absolute time (or we do not have its putative idea) independent of this relation. It is not 
"possible for time alone ever to make its appearance," as "time is nothing but the manner, in 
which some real objects exist," Hume says (T 1.2.3.7; SBN 35, 1.2.5.28; SBN 64; see also 
Isaacson 2008: 82). 
 
Hume is conscious that his account of time is against the "common opinion of philosophers 
as well as of the vulgar," who assume that steadfast objects endure. Because of his strict 
empiricism, Hume cannot accept such a false notion. It is by means of "fiction,” that is, 
without having ideas that “represent the objects or impressions, from which they are deriv’d” 
that “we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable" (T 1.2.3.11; SBN 37). ”There 
is no observable evidence that the structure of time is uniform across space," notes Baxter 
(2015: 214).  
 
As in Hume, Einstein’s ontology of time is also intrinsically related to his empiricism. 
Consider the following arguments of Einstein: 
 
“in any ontological question, our concern can only be to seek out those 
characteristics in the complex of sense experiences to which the concepts refer” 
(1981: 271).  
 
“[concepts] of space and time can only claim validity in so far as they stand in a 
clear relation to experiences” (Norton 2010: 369). 
 
Although there are essential similarities between Hume and Einstein’s philosophical analysis 
related to his special relativity, namely the intertwinement of empiricism of concepts and 
relationist ontology concerning space and time, there are also crucial differences. These 
differences pertain both to the epistemology of ideas and concepts as well as to the ontology 
of time (and space). 
 
Hume's empiricism is much more radical than Einstein's. In Hume simple ideas are caused by 
simple impressions; the origin of all of our simple ideas are in sensuous impressions. Einstein 
does not share this view. In his account, "physical concepts are free creations of the human 
mind" (Einstein, Infeld 1960: 31). He thought that the formation of concepts requires 
conventional stipulations. He did not subscribe to Hume's position concerning the origin of 
concepts (abstract ideas). On the other hand, both Hume and Einstein seem to have thought 
that the way ideas or concepts get their meaning and justification is by a reference to 
sensuous impressions. 
 
Regarding the ontology of time, Hume is concerned with the way the mind acquires the idea 
of time. In Einstein's account, time is a physical quantity. This indicates that when the two are 
speaking about time, they are not referring to the exact same thing. Hume is more interested 
in the psychological and phenomenological dimensions of time, the way the human mind 
perceives time. Einstein is addressing physical time, that is, time as a natural phenomenon. 
To Einstein "observer" is a technical term which denotes an inertial frame of reference with 
respect to with a measurement device is at rest. As Bradley Dowden comments, the observer 
"need not to have a mind." (Dowden 2017) 
 
Moreover, according to Hume's view, the ideas of space and time are distinctly separable; 
there are successions of impressions (such as auditory impressions) which are not themselves 
physically located (T 1.4.5.10; SBN 235; Baxter 2008: 37). This means that in Hume there 
can be time without physical events taking place. To the contrary, Einstein's argument for the 
relativity of simultaneity connects temporal order to the order in which physical events take 
place (in a specific inertial frame). The order of events can be different from experimenters' 
direct observations of the timely order of events. To quote from a contemporary physics 
textbook (Knight 2008: 1153), the crux of the matter is this:  
 
Simultaneity is determined by when the events actually happen, not when they 
are seen or observed. In general, simultaneous events are not seen at the same 
time because of the difference in light travel times from the events to an 
experimenter. 
 
In special relativity it is a mistake to conflate "'simultaneously seen' and 'simultaneously 
happening,'" as Einstein (1936: 358) himself asserts. It is not clear whether Hume's radical 
(and skeptical) empiricism could license us to infer that our perceptions are different from 
physical events, and that our perceptions are caused by perception-independent natural 
events. 
 
However, in both Hume and Einstein their epistemology of ideas and concepts is related to 
their ontological commitments concerning time, so it is meaningful to compare their views. 
As there are salient confluences of their positions, and as there is evidence that Einstein was 
reading Hume before the formulation of his new theory, it can be concluded that Hume's 
philosophy did partly contribute to Einstein's work with his special relativity. 
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Notes: 
 
                                                          
1 It is somewhat problematic to depict "natural philosophy" in the 17th and 18th centuries as 
"natural science." The disciplinary boundaries of our time are not the same as they were in 
the early modern world. Moreover, potential terminological confusions may arise when we 
use our contemporary language to interpret the past. The meaning of the word ”philosophy” 
in the 18th century context is quite close to the meaning of the word “science” in our 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contemporary use of the term. See the entry of “Philosophy” in Ephraim Chambers’ 
dictionary from the year 1728 (Chambers 1728: 803). 
 
2 Kevin Meeker (2011) has challenged Ayer’s interpretation. 
 
  
3 For different interpretations on Hume on causation, see Helen Beebee (2006: Chapters 5, 6 
and 7). 
 
 
4 For history of natural selection before Darwin, see Conway Zirkle (1941). On Hume’s 
relation to Darwinism, see Simon Blackburn (2009). 
 
5 To just say that our commonsensical picture of time is similar compared to Newton's 
conception of time is certainly an understatement. In short, the aim of Newton's argument for 
absolute space and time in the Scholium to the Definitions of the Principia is to make a 
difference between true and relative motion, that is, between acceleration exerted by a force 
and rest or motion with constant velocity. However, in this chapter, it is not possible to 
properly analyze Newton's account. For a thorough analysis of Newton's argument for 
absolute space and time, see Robert DiSalle (2002). 
 
6 Although Einstein is credited for the first publication of STR, many mathematicians and 
physicists took part in its creation, including Hendrik Lorentz (1853-1928), Henri Poincaré 
(1854-1912), and Hermann Minkowski (1864-1909) (Janssen, Lehner 2014: 11). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 However, there are other physical theories which indicate the direction of time, such as the 
second law of thermodynamics. 
 
8 Donald L. M. Baxter (2009: 37) provides a "brick wall" diagram that is very helpful for 
understanding Hume's reasoning in this issue. 
 
9 In this idealized example, observers' bodily motions are not taken into account. She could 
also have a succession of ideas in the mind, which would be a source for the idea of time. 
